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Abstract
We start by presenting the general model of dynamic coordination with timing frictions and some
key theoretical results. We prove the model features a unique rationalizable equilibrium, present a
method to solve the social planner problem and derive expressions for the equilibrium threshold in
limiting cases. With this toolkit in hand, we get analytical results for a case with linear preferences
and present several applications, ranging from network externalities to statistical discrimination and
to macroeconomics. Besides generating insights for specific questions, the applications illustrate the
potential of the model to accommodate a large set of economic problems. Last, we show extensions of
the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates, preemption motives and ex-ante heterogeneous
agents.
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2
1 Introduction
Several economic problems exhibit strategic complementarities: one’s payoff from some
action is larger if others take this action as well. For example, in a scenario of bank
runs, withdrawing deposits from the bank might be the optimal action only if others also
do so; the decision about joining and posting on Facebook depends crucially on whether
other people are doing the same; for firms considering whether to invest or not, one
important factor is the demand for their goods, which in turn depends on whether other
firms choose to invest; adopting a new technology may not be the best decision if others
in the production chain will keep working with an old technology.
A variety of models that capture these economic problems gives rise to multiple equi-
libria. In a range of parameters, different outcomes can arise in equilibrium depending on
what agents expect others will do. For example, in models of bank runs, for an interme-
diate range of fundamentals, there is an equilibrium where agents attempt to withdraw
their deposits and banks go bankrupt and another one where runs do not occur; in models
of network externalities, equilibria predicting the prevalence of different networks coex-
ist; in macroeconomic models, economic activity might depend on arbitrary shifts on
expectations.
One important question left unanswered by models with multiple equilibria is what
determines which equilibrium will be played. Will there be a bank run or not? Will
people coordinate on Facebook, Orkut or Google+? Will economic activity recover next
year?
This survey focuses on a stream of the literature that looks at the problem from a
dynamic point of view. In the model of Frankel and Pauzner (2000), the seminal contri-
bution to this literature, agents choose between two states (say, low and high) and get
opportunities to revise their behavior according to a Poisson clock. Their instantaneous
utility gain from being in the high state increases on a exogenous fundamental variable
and on the fraction of agents in the high state. The fundamental moves according to a
Brownian motion.1
As an illustration, agents might be on Facebook or not. The utility from being on
Facebook depends on how good Facebook is (the exogenous fundamental) and how many
people are on Facebook. At some random points in time, agents decide whether they want
to be on Facebook or not. Here, the Poisson clock can be seen as an attention friction
modeled in a reduced-form way. In other applications, the Poisson clock could be related
to the maturity of a bond or an investment, or to the obsolescence of a machine.
1See also Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001).
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Section 2 presents the framework proposed by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and some
results for the general model. First, it presents results on equilibrium multiplicity and
equilibrium uniqueness. Then, it shows a method to solve the social planner problem.
Last, it applies mathematical results about bifurcation probabilities from Burdzy, Frankel
and Pauzner (1998) to derive expressions for the equilibrium threshold in the limiting cases
of vanishing shocks and vanishing frictions.
With this toolkit in hand, Section 3 shows analytical results for a case with linear pref-
erences and presents applications of the basic framework to a variety of settings, such as
network externalities, statistical discrimination and stimulus policies in macroeconomics.
Besides generating insights for specific questions, the applications illustrate the potential
of the model to accommodate a large set of economic problems. Last, Section 4 discusses
extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates, preemption motives
and ex-ante heterogeneous agents.
Some of the material in this survey is not in the existing literature. Examples include:
the general formulation for the social planner problem (Section 2.3); the model with
asymmetric network externalities (Section 3.1.4); the study of efficiency in the model of
statistical discrimination (Section 3.2.2); and the numerical solution for the macroeco-
nomic model (Section 3.3.4).
Related strands of the literature. Among the alternative ways to understand agents’
behavior in settings with strategic complementarities, the so-called global games literature
is a particularly popular one (See Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin
(1998) and Morris and Shin (2003)). Models in this literature assume that agents have
access to noisy private information about the economy. This removes the assumptions
that all information is common knowledge and agents know what others are doing in
equilibrium. One important result of this literature is that this can remove multiplicity
of equilibria and lead to a unique outcome. Building on the theory of global games, a
large literature has evolved. Angeletos and Lian (2016) offer a comprehensive survey of
this literature.
Another strand of literature addresses this problem by incorporating dynamic and evo-
lutionary processes. Examples include Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Kandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992)). In simple 2x2 games, these different
strands of the literature lead to similar predictions, but this is not true more generally
(see Kim (1996) for a discussion).
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2 The framework
Time is continuous and runs forever. There is a continuum of agents with unit mass
indexed by i. There are two possible actions ai ∈ {0, 1}.
Payoffs. An agent’s payoff depends on her own action, the action of others and on some
exogenous fundamental θt. The action of other players is summarized by the proportion
of players in action 1, denoted by nt. The instantaneous payoff of action 0 is given by
a function u0(θt, nt) and the payoff of action 1 is written as u1(θt, nt), both continuously
differentiable. We define the instantaneous relative gain of action 1 as
∆u(nt, θt) = u1(θt, nt)− u0(θt, nt).
Throughout these notes, we assume that ∆u(·) is increasing in both arguments. It means
that agents’ incentives to choose action 1 are increasing on the exogenous fundamental
and on the action of others (there are strategic complementarities).
Timing frictions. Agents cannot choose their actions at every period. They receive op-
portunities to revise their actions according to a Poisson clock (independent across agents)
with arrival rate δ. Once they choose an action they are locked in the chosen action until
the Poisson shock hits again.
Simple examples. In a model where agents choose whether to participate in a given
network or not, action 1 corresponds to taking part in the network and θ is a variable
summarizing the intrinsic quality of the network. Thus u1(θt, nt) is the utility from par-
ticipating, increasing in the quality of the network and in the number of people taking
part, and u0(θt, nt) can be normalized to 0. Alternatively, actions 0 and 1 can refer to two
competing networks, agents choose between them. In this case, u1(θt, nt) is increasing in
nt and u0(θt, nt) is decreasing in nt. In a model of occupational choice along the lines
of Matsuyama (1991), action 1 corresponds to an occupation that benefits from others
choosing it as well (in the example, industry) and action 0 corresponds to an occupation
with no such externalities (in the example, agriculture). In these examples, the timing
frictions can be thought of as attention frictions.
The discounted expected gain of choosing 1 instead of zero at some date τ is given by
Vτ =
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)E [∆u(θt, nt)] dt, (1)
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where ρ > 0 is the discount rate of agents. Notice that an agent’s decision today only
affects her payoffs until she gets selected again. That is why the probability of not getting
selected from τ to t, which is given by e−δ(t−τ), shows up in the expression above. Hence
agents effectively discount the future at rate ρ + δ. They choose 1 if Vτ > 0 and 0 if
Vτ < 0.
An action is dominant if it is optimal for an agent to choose that action regardless of his
beliefs about the action of others. Throughout this notes, we assume that the assumption
below holds.
Assumption 1 (Existence of dominance regions). There exists θ˜ and θ˜ such that: if
θt > θ˜ choosing 1 is a strictly dominant action; if θt < θ˜ choosing 0 is a strictly dominant
action.
2.1 Multiple equilibrium benchmark
Here we analyze the case where the fundamental is constant and deterministic, i.e., θt = θ.
Take an agent deciding whether or not to choose action 1 when nt = nτ . Suppose it is
optimal for her to choose action 1 if she believes everyone that will choose after her will
do the same. Then, players choosing after her have even an higher incentive to choose
action 1 (because at time τ > t, nτ will be larger than nt). Therefore, everyone choosing
action 1 forever is an equilibrium. Conversely, if it is optimal for an agent to choose 0
if she believes everyone will do the same, then everyone choosing action 0 forever is an
equilibrium.
To find the values of θ for which everyone choosing action 1 is an equilibrium, we
compute two boundaries: (i) the boundary where an agent is indifferent between 0 and 1
if she believes that everyone will choose 1 in the future; (ii) the boundary where an agent
is indifferent if she believes no one will choose action 1 in the future. Those are given by
the solution of ∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)∆u(θ, n↑t )dt = 0 (2)
and ∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)∆u(θ, n↓t )dt = 0, (3)
where n↑t = 1− (1− nτ )e−δ(t−τ) and n↓t = nτe−δ(t−τ).
For any τ > t, n↑t > n
↓
t . Hence, for a given θ and nτ , the LHS in (2) is larger than the
LHS in (3). Therefore, for a given nτ , the value of θ that satisfies (2) must be smaller
than the value of θ that satisfies (3). Intuitively, if agents expect all others to choose to
action 1, they are willing to do the same for lower values of θ.
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Moreover, since n↑t is increasing in nτ and ∆u(θ, n
↑
t ) is increasing in both arguments,
the value of θ that satisfies (2) is decreasing in nτ . Likewise, since n
↓
t is increasing in nτ ,
the value of θ that satisfies (3) is also decreasing in nτ .
The solutions of (2) and (3) are represented by the curves θ and θ, respectively, in
Figure 1. To the right of θ choosing 1 is a dominant action; to the left of θ choosing 0
is the dominant action; between the boundaries θ and θ we have multiple equilibria and
agents’ choices depend on their expectations about the actions of others.
Figure 1: Multiple equilibria with no shocks
Multiple
equilibria
All choose
action 1
All choose
action 0
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ θ
In this setting, agents can perfectly anticipate the future actions of others. Hence there
is no strategic uncertainty. As we see next, this has important implications.
2.2 Equilibrium uniqueness
Now we assume that the fundamentals are subject to stochastic shocks. The key difference
from the case without shocks is that now agents may not be able to perfectly anticipate
the action of others in the future. Assume that
dθt = µdt+ σdZt,
where dZt is a standard Brownian motion, µ is a constant drift and σ > 0 is the volatility.
The process above have two properties that are convenient. First, shocks are frequent:
for any interval of length dt > 0 we have that Prob(θt = θt+dt) = 0. Second, their
increments are independent of history, i.e., θt+dt − θt is independent of (θs)s≤t. With
shocks, multiplicity disappears.
Theorem 1 (Frankel and Pauzner, 2000). In the model with shocks, there is a unique
equilibrium. Agents choose 1 when θt > θ
∗(nt) and 0 when θt < θ∗(nt), where θ∗(·) is a
decreasing function.
Figure 2 illustrates the result. An agent choosing an action at some point on the
equilibrium threshold must be indifferent between both actions. Formally, for every nτ ∈
7
Figure 2: Unique equilibrium with shocks
All choose
action 1
All choose
action 0
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗
[0, 1], θ∗(nτ ) must solve:∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)E [∆u(θt, nt)| θ∗, θ∗(nτ ), nτ ]dt = 0, (4)
where the operator E
[
·|θ˜, θτ , nτ
]
denotes agents’ expectation when the current state is
(θτ , nτ ) and they expects others to play according to the threshold θ˜.
To understand the intuition behind the result, it is useful to go through the proof. The
proof here is slightly different from the original proof in Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and
a bit more similar to the proof of equilibrium uniqueness in Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2003), even though that is a static global-game model.
2.2.1 Proof of equilibrium uniqueness
A key assumption is that we have dominance regions, as represented by the boundaries
θ0 and θ0 in Figure 3. Instead of looking for a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium,
we are going to look for strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies (hereafter, IESDS). This is a less restrictive equilibrium concept,
since every Nash Equilibrium also survives IESDS (but not all strategy that survive
IESDS is a Nash Equilibrium).
A strategy here is a map from every possible history to a probability of choosing action
1 (i.e., a map that prescribes what an agent selected by the Poisson process will choose
in every contingency).
Iterations from the left. Let’s start a process of elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. Notice that any strategy that prescribes playing 1 to the left of θ0 is strictly dom-
inated. Therefore, we can remove those strategies from our game (we can also remove
strategies that prescribe playing 0 to the right of θ0, but let’s leave them there for a while).
We can now ask the same question we asked to construct the boundary θ0: when
is an agent indifferent between actions 0 and 1 under the most optimistic belief about
8
Figure 3: Dominance regions
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ0 θ0
Action 0
is dominant
Action 1
is dominantP
(nt)t≥τ? The difference now is that, after eliminating the strictly dominated strategies,
the meaning of ‘most optimistic belief’ changed. It is no longer possible to assume that
agents will play action 1 always, since we eliminated strategies that prescribed playing
1 to the left of θ0 and the probability of θt crossing the boundary θ0 at some point is
positive. Thus, the most optimistic belief now is the one in which other agents play 1
in any state (θt, nt), except in those states to the left θ0. Under those beliefs, an agent
choosing at the point P in Figure 3 will no longer be indifferent between action 1 and 0.
She will strictly prefer to choose action 0 (if she was indifferent under a more optimistic
belief, now she is strictly preferring to choose action 0). Thus, the boundary where an
agent is indifferent under the most optimistic belief shifts to the right, as illustrated by
the boundary θ1 in Figure 4.
Figure 4: First round of elimination of dominated strategies
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ0 θ0θ1
Now we can move to the second round of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
After eliminating the strategies that imply playing 1 in the dark gray area in Figure 4,
the strategies that imply playing 1 in the light gray area also become strictly dominated
strategies (agents wouldn’t choose it even under the most optimistic belief possible).
Thus, we further eliminate the strategies that imply playing 1 to the left of θ1 and we get
a boundary θ2. Continuing this process indefinitely we get a boundary θ∞, as illustrated
in Figure 5. Notice that θ∞ must be to the left of θ0, since in the latter agents believe
everyone will always choose 0, while in the former they believe that everyone to the left
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of θ∞ will choose 0 (and thus they require a lower initial θ to be indifferent).
Figure 5: Convergence of iterations from the left
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ0 θ0θ1 θ2 θ∞
All choose action 0
So far we know that in any strategy that survives the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies agents play 0 to the left of θ∞. Notice also that an agent making a
decision on the threshold θ∞ must be indifferent between 0 and 1 (otherwise the iterations
could continue). Thus, everyone playing 1 to the right of θ∞ and 0 to the left of it must
be a Nash equilibrium. We have just proved equilibrium existence.
Iterations from the right. We can repeat an analogous procedure starting from the bound-
ary θ0, by first eliminating the strategies in which agents play 0 to the right of θ0. The
only difference is that now we will always consider the most pessimistic beliefs possible
about nt in each iteration, given the strategies that we have already eliminated. This
process will yield a boundary θ∞. In any equilibrium that survives the iterated elimina-
tion of strictly dominated strategies, agents must play 0 to the left of θ∞. As for θ∞,
notice that everyone playing according to θ∞ is an equilibrium, since agents are indifferent
between both actions on the threshold θ∞ if they believe others will play according to
this threshold.
Limit of iterations coincide. Notice that θ∞ cannot be to the left of θ∞, otherwise there
would be no strategy that survives IESDS (we know it cannot be true since a Nash
Equilibrium exists and every Nash equilibrium survives IESDS).2
If θ∞ and θ∞ coincide for every n, then we have an essentially unique equilibrium.
3
Suppose by contradiction that it is not the case, as exemplified in Figure 6. Then, we
can always get a translation of θ∞ that lies entirely to the left of θ∞, but touches it in at
least one point, as represented by the curve θ
′
∞ in the figure.
2If θ∞ is to the left of θ∞, then there is a subset V of the state space such that: (i) every strategy that survives
IESDS requires playing 1 when (θt, nt) ∈ V ; (ii) every strategy that survives IESDS requires playing 0 when (θt, nt) ∈ V .
Obviously, no strategy can satisfy (i) and (ii) at the same time.
3The word “essentially” appears because agents can do whatever they want on the threshold, but those states have zero
mass.
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Figure 6: Translations
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∞θ∞
All choose
action 0
All choose
action 1
θ
′
∞
A B
Consider a player that is choosing at point A and believes everyone will play according
to θ
′
∞. Her payoff of choosing 1 must be strictly positive, since it would be zero if she
believed everyone would play according to θ∞ and therefore choose action 1 less often for
any Brownian path (remember that θ∞ is an equilibrium).
Consider now the payoff of player B. For player B, the increments (θτ+s − θτ ) follow
the same distribution as the increments for player A, since θ
′
∞ is a translation of θ∞. In
other words, for any Brownian path (Zt)t≥τ player B observes the same fundamentals as
player A plus a positive constant (that is the distance between their thresholds). Thus,
for any Brownian path, player A will have θt to the left (right) of her threshold if, and
only if, player B also has her θt to the left (right) of her threshold. Thus, they will
always experience the same dynamics of nt, but player B always experiences a higher
fundamental. Thus, the relative payoff of player B of choosing action 1 (which we know
to be zero, since θ∞ is an equilibrium) must be higher than that of player A . Thus we
get the contradiction:
0 = (Player B’s gain of choosing 1) > (Player A’s gain of choosing 1) > 0.
2.2.2 Relation to ‘global games’
The basic global-game models are static coordination games, where agents observe a noisy
idiosyncratic signal on the fundamental variable that determines payoffs (θ).4 Owing to
this idiosyncratic noise, as long as there are dominance regions, it is never common knowl-
edge that the fundamental variable lies in a region where the equilibrium could be driven
4There are several dynamic models employing the global-game methodology. Examples include Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2007), Dasgupta (2007), Steiner (2008), Chassang (2010), Dasgupta, Steiner and Stewart (2012), Kova´cˇ and Steiner
(2013) and Mathevet and Steiner (2013). However, dynamics is not needed to generate equilibrium uniqueness and the
basic insights from the methodology. This section highlights the analogies between the dynamic framework considered here
and static global-game models.
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by self-fulfilling beliefs. Moreover, agents do not know what others are doing in equilib-
rium. Based on their own signals, agents form expectations about others’ information
and expectations about others’ expectations (higher-order expectations).
The intuition for equilibrium uniqueness in global games is similar to the intuition for
Theorem 1. An agent with a signal about fundamentals very close to the region where,
say, action 1 is dominant considers that others might think that fundamentals lie in the
dominance region and will choose action 1. Hence action 1 is the best choice for this agent.
This triggers a similar process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies that
end up with a unique rationalizable strategy.
This dynamic framework seems different because all information is common knowledge.
Morris (2014) shows that this intuition is misleading: what matters is not players’ actual
beliefs but what their beliefs were at their last opportunity to switch actions. Now consider
that an event is effectively known by a player if she knew it the last time she had an
opportunity to change behavior. Then there is a tight connection between the lack of
effective common knowledge here and the lack of common knowledge in global-game
models (See Morris (2014)).
2.3 The social planner’s problem
We now study the social planner’s problem. Let’s say welfare is given by the discounted
sum of individual agents’ payoffs (which depend on others’ actions as well). Thus, the
planner maximizes:
E
[∫ ∞
t=τ
e−ρ(t−τ)W (θt, nt)dt
]
, (5)
where
W (θ, n) = nu1(θ, n) + (1− n)u0(θ, n). (6)
At each date t, the planner chooses the proportion φt ∈ [0, 1] of agents that received a
chance to switch actions that will pick action 1.
Suppose that at a given date τ it is optimal for the planner to choose φτ < 1 and
consider the following deviation: the planner increases φτ in ∆φ > 0 units today, but keeps
the future values of φt unchanged, for any realization of the Brownian path. Increasing
φt by ∆φ today, raises nτ by δ∆φdt ≡ dφ. But at a given date t > τ a proportion e−δ(t−τ)
has already been selected again. Therefore, the resulting change in n at time t ≥ τ is:
dnt = dφe
−δ(t−τ).
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This deviation is not profitable if∫ ∞
τ
Eτ
[
e−ρ(t−τ)
∂W (θt, nt)
∂n
e−δ(t−τ)dφ
]
dt ≤ 0,
which becomes ∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)Eτ
[
∂W (θt, nt)
∂n
]
dt ≤ 0. (7)
Now assume that φτ > 0 and the planner chooses a similar deviation, but with dφ < 0.
The same reasoning implies that this deviation is not profitable if∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)Eτ
[
∂W (θt, nt)
∂n
]
dt ≥ 0. (8)
This implies the following necessary conditions for optimality: if φτ = 0 then (7) holds;
if φτ = 1 then (8) holds; if φτ ∈ (0, 1) then (7) holds with equality. But those are exactly
the necessary (and sufficient) conditions for a Nash Equilibrium in the game where the
relative payoff ∆u(θ, n) is replaced by ∂W (θ,n)
∂n
(see equation (1)).
Hence, if we find the set of Nash Equilibria in this modified game, we have found all the
candidates for the planner solution. But as long as ∂W (θ,n)
∂n
satisfies the same conditions
we imposed on ∆u(θ, n) and we have shocks, the equilibrium is unique and therefore these
necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality.
Therefore the planner plays a modified game, in which the flow gain of choosing 1 is
given by
dW (θ, n)
dn
= [u1(θ, n)− u0(θ, n)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆u(θ,n)
+
[
n
∂u1(θ, n)
∂n
+ (1− n)∂u0(θ, n)
∂n
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Externality
. (9)
The agent considers the first term in brackets, but does not consider the externality
on others. The difference between the planner’s problem and the agents’ problem is the
second term in brackets. Looking at how they relate, we might get some intuition for how
the planner’s threshold relates to the agents’ threshold.
2.4 Bifurcation probabilities
We now discuss other results that will be useful when explicitly caracterizing the equilib-
rium in some particular cases. For simplicity of the exposition, assume µ = 0 hereafter,
unless stated otherwise. Suppose agents play according to some decreasing threshold
θ∗(n) (as we have seen, they do that in equilibrium).5 Let’s look to the limiting case
5There are additional technical requirements that are always satisfied by an equilibrium threshold. In particular, θ∗(·)
must be a Lipschitz function.
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where shocks are very small, i.e., σ → 0.6 What is the dynamics of nt when the economy
starts off at some point on the threshold θ∗(n)?
This mathematical problem is studied by Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (1998). They
show that, as σ → 0, the economy either bifurcates in the direction of n = 0 or in the
direction of n = 1, and never comes back. Moreover, the time it takes for the economy to
start heading off in one direction or the other goes to zero. The economy instantaneously
moves in one of the directions indicated by the arrows in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Bifurcation probabilities
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗
n0
n˙↑t = δ(1− n↑t )
n˙↓t = −δn↓t
When the economy is at the threshold, a small positive shock pushes the economy to the
right of it and nt goes up. Negative shocks push the economy to the left of the threshold
and thus n goes down. Since the threshold is negatively sloped, once the economy stays
away for a while to the right of the threshold, as n goes up, it drifts further away from
the threshold and never comes back. The same logic applies when a sequence of negative
shocks hit. Since shocks are very small and frequent, the bifurcation happens very quickly.
Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (1998) shows that as σ → 0, the time until it bifurcates
converges to zero.
But what is the probability of the economy moving in either direction? Burdzy, Frankel
and Pauzner (1998) show that it is proportional to the speed that the economy moves in
either direction. More specifically:
Prob(bifurcate up)
Prob(bifurcate down)
=
initial speed of nt if bifurcates up
initial speed of nt if bifurcates down
=
∣∣∣n˙↑0∣∣∣∣∣∣n˙↓0∣∣∣ , (10)
which implies that
Prob(bifurcate up) = 1− n0 and Prob(bifurcate down) = n0. (11)
To understand the intuition, suppose σ ≈ 0 and that nt moves up very quickly when to
the right of the threshold and goes down very slowly when to the left of it. Then, a small
6The result presented in this section holds for µ, σ → 0, regardless of the relative speed at which µ and σ go to zero.
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sequence positive shocks moves the economy very far from the threshold, but we need a
very large sequence of negative shocks to get far away from it. If positive and negative
shocks are equally likely, it makes sense to think that it is more likely that economy will
bifurcate up.
2.5 Results for limiting cases
Although in general it is not easy to compute the equilibrium threshold θ∗(n), in two
limiting cases the model is especially tractable: (i) when σ → 0 and (ii) when δ → ∞.
Besides providing approximate results for the cases with small shocks and small frictions,
these limiting cases are interesting for helping us to understand how small departures
from the case with no shocks and/or no timing frictions affect equilibrium outcomes.
2.5.1 Vanishing shocks
When σ → 0, we can use the results from Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (1998), namely
that the time until bifurcation converges to zero and the bifurcation probabilities in (11),
to compute the beliefs of an agent deciding on the threshold. The indifference condition
that solves for the equilibrium threshold in (4) becomes:
(1− n0)
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t∆u(θ∗(n0), n
↑
t )dt+ n0
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t∆u(θ∗(n0), n
↓
t )dt = 0, (12)
where n↑t = 1 − (1 − n0)e−δt and n↓t = n0e−δt. Solving the expression for θ∗ we get the
equilibrium threshold. Alternatively, we can apply the change of variables v = n↑t and
v = n↓t in the integrals above to get:∫ n0
0
(
v
n0
) ρ
δ 1
δ
∆u(θ∗(n0), v)dv +
∫ 1
n0
(
1− v
1− n0
) ρ
δ 1
δ
∆u(θ∗(n0), v)dv = 0. (13)
Figure 8 depicts the equilibrium. The curves θopt and θpes represent the two extreme
equilibria of the game with no shocks – (‘opt’ and ‘pes’ stand for optimistic and pessimistic
beliefs, respectively). Notice that the threshold θ∗ touches θopt when n = 0, since the
bifurcation probabilities imply that agents expect nt to go up forever with probability one
at the state (θ∗(0), 0). Similarly, θ∗ touches θpes when n = 1, since the system bifurcates
down with probability one at the state (θ∗(1), 1).
2.5.2 Vanishing frictions
With vanishing frictions (δ → ∞) agents are allowed to switch actions at almost every
period. To derive the equilibrium in this case, it is useful to write down our environment
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Figure 8: Equilibrium with vanishing shocks
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θopt θpes
θ∗
in a different unit of time. Suppose that date t in the new unit of time is represented by
t˜ = δt. For instance, if we were initially measuring time in years and δ = 12, it means that
we are now measuring time in months. The arrival rate of the Poisson process becomes
δ˜ = 1; the discount rate becomes ρ˜ = ρ/δ; the variance of the change in fundamentals
between t˜ and t˜+1 becomes σ˜2 = σ2/δ.7 Sending δ to infinity is thus equivalent to taking
the limit when ρ→ 0 and σ → 0.
We know from the previous section that when σ → 0, the threshold is characterized
by (13). Taking the limit when ρ → 0 in (13), we get that the threshold θ∗(n0) is given
by:8 ∫ 1
0
∆u(θ∗(n0), v)dv = 0. (14)
Notice that the expression above does not depend on n0, and thus θ
∗(n0) is constant.
Figure 9 shows the equilibrium in this case.
Figure 9: Equilibrium with vanishing frictions
All choose
action 1
All choose
action 0
n = 1
n = 0
θθ
∗
The equilibrium does not depend on the current value of n, just on the fundamental.
The result may seem to follow immediately from the fact that the nt moves very quickly
in this economy (true), which would imply that the current value of nt is irrelevant (false).
This intuition is incorrect because although the economy can move very quickly from a
7(θt+s − θt) ∼ N(0, σ2s), for every t and s. Thus, σ2 represents the variance of (θt+1 − θt).
8This expression coincides with the equilibrium condition in a static global game where agents have a diffuse prior, get
a noisy signal about θ and their payoffs are ∆u(θ, n). See Morris and Shin (2003).
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low n to a high n, the next opportunity to change behavior also comes very quickly, so
the agent effectively discounts the future at rate ρ+ δ.
The intuition for the irrelevance of the current value of n is the following. An agent
starting at n = 0 will experience n from 0 to h†, where h† is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]; while an agent starting at h = 1 will experience h from 1 to 1−h†. Hence the agent
starting at n = 0 will experience a lower range of values of n than the agent starting at
n = 1 (before their next opportunity to choose again). However, for the agent starting
at n = 0, the economy moves up very quickly at lower values of n, but very slowly as n
approaches 1, so the last agents to change their decision will spend relatively more time
at high values of n. As it turns out, this effects exactly offset the previous one, so agents
at n = 0 and n = 1 are indifferent between actions 0 and 1 for the same value of θ.9
2.6 The planner’s problem with vanishing shocks
For the planner, it makes no difference whether there are no shocks or shocks are very
small (the planner does not face a coordination problem with itself). Hence the model
can be solved in two different ways: assuming vanishing shocks (σ → 0) or no shocks
(σ = 0).
The case σ → 0. As shown in section 2.3, as long as ∂W (θ, n)/∂n satisfies the same
conditions we imposed on ∆u(θ, n) and we have shocks, the planner’s problem can be seen
as analogous to the agents’ problem, only with different payoffs. Considering vanishing
shocks, we can then apply the bifurcation probabilities to solve for the planner’s threshold.
The indifference condition characterizing the planner’s threshold is given by
(1− n0)
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t
∂W (θP , n↑t )
∂n
dt+ n0
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t
∂W (θP , n↓t )
∂n
dt = 0,
where again n↑t = 1− (1−n0)e−δt and n↓t = n0e−δt, and ∂W (θ, n)/∂n is given by equation
(9). Solving this equation for θP gives us the planner’s threshold as a function of n0.
The case σ = 0. We can also compute the planner’s threshold by searching for the curve
θP (n0) along which the planner is indifferent between sending agents to network 1 forever,
or to network 0 forever, assuming there are no shocks to fundamentals. Assuming σ = 0,
for a given n0 the planner is indifferent between an upward or a downward path for nt
9See also the explanation in Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001).
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when θP satisfies:∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
n↑tu1(θ
P , n↑t ) + (1− n↑t )u0(θP , n↑t )
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
n↓tu1(θ
P , n↓t ) + (1− n↓t )u0(θP , n↓t )
]
dt. (15)
The two approaches must lead to the same resulting threshold θP (n0).
3 Applications
We now consider applications of the framework presented in Section 2 to a variety of
settings. All these models can be seen as particular cases of the basic framework, but
their implications are substantially different. In particular, the efficiency results are quite
different across models.
3.1 Linear utility
We now consider a particular case of the model where the agents’ utility is a linear function
of θt and nt, as in Guimaraes and Pereira (2016). This case is particularly tractable as it
allows for closed form solutions in the limiting cases previously discussed.
Agents’ utility functions are given by
u0t (θ
0
t , nt) = θ
0
t + ν
0(1− nt) and u1t (θ1t , nt) = θ1t + ν1nt,
where θjt represents the fundamentals affecting the flow-payoff of action j and follows a
Brownian motion with drift µj and variance σ
2
j . The flow-utility of those choosing action
j increases linearly in the mass of agents taking the same action. We can write the relative
payoff function as
∆u(θt, nt) = θt + γnt,
where θt ≡ θt1 − θt0 − ν0 follows a Brownian motion with drift µ = µ1 − µ0 and variance
σ = σ20 + σ
2
1, and γ ≡ ν0 + ν1. Assume ν0 and ν1 are such that γ > 0. Notice ∆u(·)
satisfies all the assumptions listed in section 2.
This is a general linear case. When µ0 = σ
2
0 = ν
0 = 0, one of the actions yields a
constant payoff. When ν0 = ν1, we have a model of network externalities that are the
same for both networks.
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3.1.1 Equilibrium threshold in limiting cases
As in the general case, an agent who receives an opportunity to revise her choice at time
τ will choose action ai = 1 if the discounted relative payoff of doing so is positive:
E
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)(θt + γnt)dt > 0. (16)
If the inequality is reversed, the agent will choose ai = 0. Theorem 1 ensures there is a
unique equilibrium in which agents play according to a downward sloping threshold. If we
focus on the limiting case with µ, σ → 0, we can simply apply the bifurcation probabilities
of section 2.4 to compute the equilibrium threshold. Substituting the expression for
∆u(θt, nt) in this tractable case into (12), we have that the indifference condition for
agents is given by
(1− n0)
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t(θl + γn↑t )dt+ n0
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t(θl + γn↓t )dt = 0.
Solving for θl, we get an explicit expression for the linear equilibrium threshold:
θl(n0) = − γδ
ρ+ 2δ
− γρ
ρ+ 2δ
n0. (17)
It is also possible to explicitly characterize the equilibrium threshold in the other
tractable limiting case: when timing frictions vanish. It suffices to substitute ∆u(θ˜l,n) =
θ˜l + γn into (14) and solve for θ˜l. Analogously, one could simply take the limit of the
right-hand side of (17) as δ →∞ to find that the threshold is given by θ˜l = −γ/2.
3.1.2 The planner problem with network externalities
We now use the model with linear utility to study efficiency in an environment with
network externalities. The expression in (6) and simple algebra yield the planner’s in-
stantaneous payoff:
W (θ, n) = θ0 + ν0 + (θ − ν0)n+ γn2,
hence
dW (θ, n)
dn
= [θ + γn]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆u(θ,n)
+ γn− ν0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Externality
.
Notice that increasing n implies a positive externality term if and only if γn > ν0, i.e, if
ν1n > ν0(1 − n). Intuitively, the choice of action 1 increases the payoff of agents locked
in action 1 but reduces the payoff of those locked in action 0. Therefore, the sign of the
externality term depends on which of those effects dominate, which in turn depends on
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the amount of agents in each action and on the relative importance of the externality for
them. From section 2.3, the planner recommends action 1 whenever∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t
[
θt − ν0 + 2γnt
]
dt > 0.
This expression for the planner is quite similar to the condition for an agent in (16). The
only substantial difference is that γ is multiplied by 2, indicating that the planner gives
more importance to externalities.
Limiting case. Assume µ, σ → 0. From section 2.6, we know the indifference condition
for the planner becomes
(1− n0)
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t
[
θP − ν0 + 2γn↑t
]
dt+ n0
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+δ)t
[
θP − ν0 + 2γn↓t
]
dt = 0.
Solving for θP , we find that the planner plays according to the threshold:
θP (n0) = ν
0 − 2γδ
ρ+ 2δ
− 2γρ
ρ+ 2δ
n0. (18)
3.1.3 Symmetric network effects
We now assume ν ≡ ν0 = ν1 so that externalities are the same for both networks. Hence
increasing n implies a positive externality term whenever n > 0.5 and a negative term
otherwise. Using ν0 = γ/2 in (18) and doing some algebra yields:
θP (n0) = − γδ
ρ+ 2δ
+
γρ
2(ρ+ 2δ)
− 2γρ
ρ+ 2δ
n0. (19)
Guimaraes and Pereira (2016) use this model to describe consumers’ choices between
two competing standards, such as the QWERTY keyboard and the alternative (and al-
legedly better) option, the Dvorak keyboard. The utility functions capture agents’ pref-
erence for higher-quality products and for using the standard that is widespread. One
can think that the QWERTY standard incidentally spread out before the higher-quality
Dvorak standard became available. We have then a conflict between the two features of
preferences: one product has the biggest network of consumers, but the other product
is the highest-quality one. Is there room for interventions such as subsidies to elimi-
nate inefficiencies in this environment? Comparing the decentralized equilibrium with
the planner’s solution shed light on this matter.
Figure 10 shows how the decentralized equilibrium relates to the planner’s solution.
To the right of θ∗, agents are willing to pick action 1, and to the left of θ∗, action 0. The
planner would mandate that action 1 is chosen whenever the economy is to the right of θP ,
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instead. We can think of a vertical line crossing (θ∗(0.5), 0.5) as a dividing line between
the regions where network 0 or network 1 are “intrinsically better”. When n = 0.5,
θ∗ = −γ/2, so along that vertical line θ1 = θ0.
Figure 10: Planner’s solution with linear utilities
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗θP
The curve θP is half as steep as θ∗. The reason is that, in a decentralized economy, an
agent at a revision opportunity considers the intrinsic quality of the two standards and
the size of each network only to the extent that network effects affect her own payoff.
The social planner dictating an agent’s choice takes into account all factors that the
agent considers plus the effect of that choice on other people. Hence, the planner will
place higher weight on the coordination with the majority than the agent. Since the
net externality from choosing action 1 is positive if (and only if) n > 0.5, the planner’s
threshold rotates around the agent’s threshold so that if n < 0.5, the planner’s threshold
lies to the right of the agents’, and if n > 0.5, it lies to the left.
As a consequence, the social planner is more conservative than agents regarding the
transition to a better but smaller network. There exist quality differences such that the
transition to the best standard (Dvorak) happens in the decentralized economy, but the
social planner would choose to stay with the worst one (QWERTY). The shaded area
represents such states where inefficient shifts to the intrinsecally best network happen. If
we observe that the transition to Dvorak has not happened in the decentralized economy,
it must be that such transition would be inefficient (and thus should not be subsidized).
The model predicts that whenever the prevailing standard is the worst-quality one, this
is surely efficient.
Common wisdom would tell us that the economy gets inefficiently stuck at low-quality
networks. The results show this intuition is misleading and highlight the importance of
the transition costs.
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3.1.4 Asymmetric network effects
Now, consider the case with ν1 6= ν0. The planner’s threshold is given by (18). When the
network effect is asymmetric, the planner not only rotates the threshold around n = 0.5,
but it also shifts the threshold in order to enlarge the region in which agents choose the
action that generates more externalities.
The next figure depicts the planner’s solution when externalities are larger in network
0 than in network 1. When ν0/ν1 > (ρ + δ)/δ, the case of Figure 11a, the externality in
network 0 is so large in comparison to the externality in 1 that the planner’s threshold
lies completely to the right of the agents’ threshold.10 The smaller the value of n, the
larger the quality gap needed for the switch to network 1 to be efficient. This is because
the planner takes into account that, when n is small, a lot of agents are stuck in action
0 (due to timing frictions) and they all would benefit from the network effects generated
by an additional decrease in n.
Figure 11b depicts the case with (ρ + δ)/δ ≥ ν0/ν1 > 1. Again, the region where the
planner chooses network 0 is enlarged in comparison to the case with symmetric network
effects, but in this case the planner’s threshold crosses the agents’ at some n > 0.5.
Figure 11: Asymmetric network effects
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗ θP
(a) Large asymmetry
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗θP
(b) Some asymmetry
10This is the case when θP (1) > θ∗(1).
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3.1.5 Alternative interpretation: negative externalities
This result is also applicable to a case where a certain action creates negative externali-
ties, but those externalities end up generating strategic complementarities. Consider the
following variation of the model: flow-utilities from states 0 and 1 are given by
u0t (θ
0
t , nt) = θ
0
t − ν0nt and u1t (θ1t , nt) = θ1t − ν1nt,
with ν0 > ν1 ≥ 0. The relative payoff function is given by
∆u(θt, nt) = θt + γnt,
with θt ≡ θt1− θt0 and γ ≡ ν0−ν1 > 0. These payoffs capture a situation in which action
1 harms everyone, but it is even more prejudicial to agents currently choosing action 0.
As an example, imagine that agents can adopt an aggressive behavior (action 1) or an
accommodating behavior (action 0). Action 1 is particularly harmful for those adopting
an accommodating behavior.11
Solving the planner’s problem in this case yields the same threshold as in (18), with
the feature that θP (1) > θ∗(1) as in Figure 11a. Agents do not internalize the harm
imposed on others when they opt for an aggressive behavior. A larger number of agents
choosing an accommodating behavior (a smaller n) implies a larger potential damage
of an additional agent choosing to behave aggressively, and thus the larger the gap in
fundamentals required for action 1 to be the right choice from a social perspective.
3.2 Statistical discrimination
This section shows a simplified version of the model of statistical discrimination in Levin
(2009). Individuals enter the economy at rate δ and decide whether or not to make an
investment and become skilled. The cost of investment C = −θ is known at the time of
the investment, where θ follows a Brownian motion.
Then, when a Poisson event occurs (again, rate δ), an individual is matched to an em-
ployer and receives her payoff. Employers observe (i) a noisy signal about the individual’s
skill; and (ii) the fraction nt of skilled individuals in the population. The signal about
the individual’s skill might be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The signal is ‘good’ with probability φH if
the individual is skilled and φL if she is not, with φH > φL. We will assume that skilled
individuals always receive a good signal, i.e., φH = 1. An individual’s payoff is equal to
11As an illustration, imagine that n is the proportion of drivers driving SUVs, and 1−n is the proportion driving sedans
and smaller cars. More SUVs means more severe car crashes, especially for sedan owners.
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the probability attached to her being skilled. When the Poisson event hits, the individual
receives her payoff and leaves the model.
The investment cost −θ can be negative. One interpretation is that θ is the expected
benefit from investment received after the employment opportunity considered in the
model net of the investment cost.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
The probability an employer assigns to an individual being skilled is
γGt =
φHnt
φHnt + φL(1− nt) and γBt =
(1− φH)nt
(1− φH)nt + (1− φL)(1− nt)
if the signal is ‘good’ and if it is ‘bad’, respectively.
The gain from investing is the increase in the probability of getting a good signal
(φH − φL) times the present value of the gain from having a good signal (γGt − γBt).
Hence an individual will decide to make the investment if
(φH − φL)E
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)δ(γGt − γBt)dt ≥ −θ.
Note that both γGt and γBt are increasing in nt. Intuitively, if nt is small, it is more
likely that a good signal is due to luck and it is more likely that a bad signal reflects the
individuals’ true level of skill. Thus the difference γGt − γBt is not necessarily increasing
in nt.
12 The assumption that φH = 1 ensures that the payoff from investing is increasing
in nt because it implies γBt = 0, meaning that individuals with a bad signal are surely
unskilled. Individuals with a good signal might be either skilled or lucky (unskilled with a
good signal) and the probability of the former is increasing in nt. Hence agents’ decisions
are strategic complements. An individual will invest if:
E
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)δ
nt(1− φL)
φL + nt(1− φL)dt ≥ −θ (20)
Although the structure of this model is different from the framework presented in
Section 2, mathematically this model can be seen as a particular case of that one. There
is always a measure-one continuum of agents in the model, as agents enter and leave the
economy at rate δ. Agents’ decisions are given by (20), which is a particular case of (4)
and the flow payoff is increasing in nt. It is easy to throw θ inside the integral to make
the flow payoff increasing in θ as well and, finally, θ follows a Brownian motion.
12For example, suppose that φH > φL = 0. Then γGt = 1 and γBt is increasing in nt. Intuitively, an individual with a
good signal must be skilled, but an individual with a bad signal might be either unskilled or unlucky, and the probability
of the latter increases with nt. In this case, γGt − γBt is decreasing in nt.
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Agents’ decisions are thus determined by a unique downward sloping threshold θ∗.
Levin (2009) highlights that for some values of θ, individuals would be investing if nt
were large, but may get stuck in a situation with low nt, reflecting the persistence of
statistical discrimination: employers are likely to believe that a good signal is likely to
reflect luck, not skill, and individuals refrain from investing.
The model captures a situation where the rewards from investment depend on whether
others believe the investment was indeed undertaken and this belief is affected by the
choices of others in the population (or, in a particular group). Beyond labor markets, this
model could be applied to other problems where statistical discrimination is an issue.
3.2.2 Efficiency
Is the persistence of statistical discrimination inefficient? Should we be particularly con-
cerned with economies with very low nt but relatively high θt?
Using the results derived in Section 2.3, we can ask how the decentralized equilibrium
compares to the planner’s solution. Consider a social planner whose flow benefit from
investment is given by the sum of payoffs of agents that leave the game at a given point
in time. This flow benefit is then given by:
W (nt) = δ(ntγGt + (1− nt)φLγGt) = δnt
Intuitively, at a given moment of time, the average payoff of agents will be nt. If signals
are perfectly informative (φL = 0), skilled agents (that amount to a proportion nt of
individuals) will receive 1 and unskilled agents will receive 0. Less informative signals
imply a lower payoff for skilled agents and a larger payoff for unskilled ones, but the
average payoff is still the fraction of skilled agents, nt. Hence, the planner faces no
coordination problem. An extra individual investing implies a gain equal to 1, that is
distributed among the population.
Following the steps from Section 2.3, we get that the planner chooses to invest if
E
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)δdt ≥ −θ
Note that this is exactly what we would obtain from (20) in case φL = 0. If φL = 0
and φH = 1, the signal about an individual is perfectly informative, so perceptions about
an agent are not affected by the characteristics of the population (or group). Hence, an
individual’s action entails no externality.
The planner’s threshold θP is given by
θP = − δ
δ + ρ
(21)
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Investment is efficient as long as the expected present value of its benefit is larger than
the cost −θ. In the (θ, n)-space, the planner chooses according to a vertical threshold (θP
is independent of nt).
3.2.3 Example
Using (13), we get the equilibrium threshold θ∗ in the limit of vanishing shocks (θ → 0):
θ∗(n0) = −
∫ n0
0
(
v
n0
) ρ
δ (1− φL)v
φL + v(1− φL)dv −
∫ 1
n0
(
1− v
1− n0
) ρ
δ (1− φL)v
φL + v(1− φL)dv
Figure 12 shows an example with ρ = 0.1, δ = 0.2. The solid vertical line at the left is
the planner’s threshold, from (21). The other curves are the equilibrium thresholds for
φL = 0.1, φL = 0.5 and φL = 0.9, starting from the left.
Figure 12: Equilibrium in case of vanishing shocks
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When φL = 0.9, the private benefit from investing is small, as unskilled agents are
likely to get a good signal. Hence, in equilibrium, investment pays off only if its cost is
close to zero. Interestingly, even when the signal is very informative, there are important
inefficiencies. The leftmost dashed curve corresponds to the case φL = 0.1 (and, as in
all other cases, φH = 1). Still, the equilibrium threshold is quite far from the efficient
benchmark, especially for low n. When n = 0, agents are willing to pay no more than
0.46 for investing, but it would be efficient to pay up to 0.67. When n = 1, agents are
willing to pay up to 0.57.
In sum, the persistence of statistical discrimination is inefficient and we should indeed
be particularly concerned with economies with very low nt but relatively high θt.
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3.3 A macroeconomic model
Kiyotaki (1988) shows that in a model with monopolistic competition and some locally
increasing returns to scale, there are multiple equilibria. Guimaraes and Machado (2017)
embed a simple model that captures those insights in a dynamic framework with timing
frictions.
The demand side is standard. A continuum of risk-neutral agents produce each a
differentiated good that are aggregated by a competitive final good producer according
to:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
, (22)
where Yt is the amount produced of the final good, yi,t is the amount purchased of the
variety produced by agent i, and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The zero profit
condition for final good producers is∫ 1
0
pi,tyi,tdi = PY, (23)
where pi,t is the price of variety i.
The intermediate good producer can operate in two regimes: 1 (High) and 0 (Low).
Chances to switch regimes arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival rate δ. Agents
in the High regime can produce up to eθtxH and agents in the low regime can produce up
to eθtxL, with xH > xL. The marginal cost is zero up to firms’ capacity, but firms must
pay a fixed cost ψ > 0 to choose the High regime when they get the chance. One should
think of moving to regime High as buying some machine that decreases the marginal cost
of production. When a producer in regime High gets the Poisson realization, the machine
fully depreciates and she gets a chance to get another one. When a producer in regime
Low gets the Poisson realization, it simply means that an investment opportunity has
arrived.
Alternatively, one could say that producers rent a machine but must pay a competitive
user cost ψ˜ = (ρ+δ)ψ that equals the expected depreciation (δψ) plus interest (ρψ). Since
agents are risk-neutral, as long as they can borrow in frictionless credit markets, they are
indifferent between buying or renting and both interpretations are equivalent.
3.3.1 Equilibrium
Let Pt be the price of the final good. Say producers of the final good will spend C on
intermediate goods. At every instant, they will choose inputs yi in order to maximize (22)
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subject to ∫ 1
0
pi,tyi,tdi = C,
taking prices of intermediate goods as given. This is a static constrained-maximization
problem. Combining the first-order conditions for intermediate goods i and j and rear-
ranging yield
pi
pj
=
(
yi
yj
)−1/ε
.
Plugging this expression into the zero-profit condition in (23) yields the usual demand for
each variety:
pi,t =
(
yi,t
Yt
) 1
ε
Pt. (24)
Using (24), and the fact that it will always be optimal to produce at maximum capacity,
we can write the profit of producers in regime High and Low as
u1 = pi,tyi,t − ψ˜ =
(
eθtxH
) ε−1
ε Y
1
ε
t Pt − ψ˜ (25)
and
u0 = pi,tyi,t =
(
eθtxL
) ε−1
ε Y
1
ε
t Pt. (26)
By market clearing we have
Yt =
(
nt
(
eθtxH
) ε−1
ε + (1− nt)
(
eθtxL
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
. (27)
Plugging (27) into (25) and (26), and normalizing Pt to 1, we get:
u1(θt, nt) = e
θtx
ε−1
ε
H
(
ntx
ε−1
ε
H + (1− nt)x
ε−1
ε
L
) 1
ε−1 − ψ˜
and
u0(θt, nt) = e
θtx
ε−1
ε
L
(
ntx
ε−1
ε
H + (1− nt)x
ε−1
ε
L
) 1
ε−1
,
which implies that
∆u(θt, nt) = e
θt
(
ntx
ε−1
ε
H + (1− nt)x
ε−1
ε
L
) 1
ε−1 (
x
ε−1
ε
H − x
ε−1
ε
L
)
− ψ˜.
Notice that the expression above is increasing in θt and nt. To guarantee the existence of
dominance regions (assumption 1), we need to impose that σ2 < 2(ρ + δ).13 Then, this
model can be seen as a particular case of the framework presented in Section 2.
13This is because the integral
∫∞
0 e
−(ρ+δ)tE[eθt ]dt =
∫∞
0 e
−(ρ+δ−0.5σ2)teθ0dt diverge to ∞ if ρ+ δ − 0.5σ2 < 0, making
it always optimal to choose regime High.
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Firms have higher incentives to invest if they expect others to do the same in the future.
This is so because of the demand externality: when others increase their production,
the demand for one’s variety increases, as shown in (24). Hence firms face a dynamic
coordination problem in their investment decisions.
In what follows, it is useful to define ∆˜u(θ, n) ≡ ∆u(θ, n) + ψ˜. Notice that ∆˜u(θ, n) is
simply the instantaneous gain in revenue of operating in regime High instead of Low. The
instantaneous losses from higher costs is ψ˜. Using (4), agents choose to invest as long as:∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)Eτ
[
∆˜u(θt, nt)
]
dt ≥ ψ. (28)
The equilibrium in given by the unique threshold θ∗ that satisfies (28).
The dynamic coordination problem faced by firms may lead to dynamic inefficiencies
that persist over time: firms may not invest today because they are not confident others
will invest tomorrow. But that contributes to lower investment tomorrow, since economic
activity will be low. In other words, the economy may get in a dynamic coordination
trap.
3.3.2 Optimal stimulus policies
Some natural questions that emerge are the following: what kind of investment subsidies
can implement the first-best? Does the dynamic coordination problem imply that a
social planner should provide counter-cyclical subsidies, i.e., higher subsidies in times of
low economic activity (low nt)? We can use this model to answer these questions.
Using (6), (25), (26) and (27), the social planner instantaneous payoff is given by
W (θ, n) = Yt − ψ˜nt,
which yields
dW (θ, n)
dn
=
(
ε
ε− 1
)
∆˜u(θt, nt)− ψ˜. (29)
As shown in Section 2.3, the social planner’s decision threshold must satisfy (5). The
planner thus chooses to invest as long as:∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)Eτ
[(
ε
ε− 1
)
∆˜u(θt, nt)− ψ˜
]
dt ≥ 0. (30)
Rearranging and using ψ˜ = (ρ+ δ)ψ yield∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)Eτ
[
∆˜u(θt, nt)
]
dt ≥ ψ − 1
ε
ψ.
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This is very similar to (28). It implies that the agents’ problem is identical to the planner’s
problem if they get an investment subsidy of 1
ε
ψ. The planner can therefore implement
the first-best by providing a constant investment subsidy. Alternatively, it could pay 1
ε−1
dollars for each unit of revenue firms get (equation 30). The important thing here is that
the planner is not more willing to incentivize investment in times of low economic activity.
Now notice that we can write agents’ payoffs as ∆u(θt, nt) = e
θtg(nt)− ψ˜. Therefore,
the planner’s flow payoff can be written as:
dW (θ, n)
dn
= eθt+log(
ε
ε−1)g(nt)− ψ˜.
Let bt = θt + log
(
ε
ε−1
)
. Notice that bt follows the same law of motion as θt. Thus the
planner’s problem is identical to the agent’s problem if the fundamental is bt instead of
θt. Hence, the planner’s threshold plotted in the (bt, nt)-space is identical to the agent’s
threshold plotted in the (θt, nt)-space, which implies that the planner’s threshold is a left
translation of the agent’s threshold, and the distance between the two is log
(
ε
ε−1
)
. This
result is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Planner’s translation
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A similar reasoning implies that the distance between the planner’s and the agents’
threshold (for a given n) is proportional to the maximum subsidy the planner is willing
to pay (which is the subsidy required to make agents invest on the planner’s threshold).
A subsidy of x units is equivalent to increasing θ in log(1− x/ψ).
Agents always benefit if others invest (action 1), regardless of their current action.
Using (9), (29) and ∆u(θ, n) = ∆˜u(θ, n) − ψ˜, we get that the externality term is always
positive (and proportional to ∆˜u(θ, n)). The planner always has higher incentives to
choose action 1 and thus chooses a threshold that lies entirely to the left of the agent’s
threshold.
But why does not the dynamic coordination problem require higher subsidies in times
of low economic activity? To better understand the results it is useful to look at the
planner’s problem in a world without shocks and with multiple equilibria.
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3.3.3 Optimal stimulus with no shocks
The solution to the planner’s problem when σ → 0 is the same as the solution with
σ = 0. But we know that the agent’s problem is very different. Figure 14 combines the
results depicted in Figure 8 and Figure 13, showing the agents’ threshold with σ → 0 (θ∗),
the two extreme equilibria of the game without shocks (θopt and θpes) and the planner’s
threshold.
Figure 14: Planner’s problem when σ = 0
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When agents play according to either θopt or θpes, the distance between the planner’s
and the agents’ threshold is larger when n = 0 than when n = 1. Therefore, regardless
of whether we choose the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ equilibrium, the model with multiple equilibria
predicts that the planner is more willing to pay subsidies in times of low economic activity,
while the model with a unique equilibrium prescribes a constant subsidy.
Figure 15 illustrates the intuition for this result. First, imagine we are in a world where
agents play according to the good equilibrium. In that case, it is harder to coordinate
when n = 0 for an intuitive reason. In times of low economic activity but reasonably good
fundamentals everyone would be happy to sign a contract that forces everyone to invest,
even though the instantaneous gains of doing so today are negative. This is because
higher investment will force a regime switch that will benefit everyone in the future. The
problem is that no one wants to be the first to invest, leading to a dynamic coordination
trap where one firm keeps waiting for the other to move. This is reflected by the negative
association between n and the distance between the planner’s threshold and the good
equilibrium in Figure 15. We dub it the dynamic problem.
Now suppose the economy is at some point between θopt and θpes and for some reason
agents are not investing. We know that in that region agents would invest if they were
as optimistic as possible. Thus, whenever agents are not investing in the region between
θopt and θpes we say that there is a beliefs problem. For instance, if agents play according
to the unique equilibrium with vanishing shocks the size of the beliefs problem for a given
n is the gray area in Figure 15. Notice that θ∗ touches the good equilibrium when n = 0
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and the bad equilibrium when n = 1.
When agents play according to the unique equilibrium with vanishing shocks, the dy-
namic problem is higher when n = 0, but the beliefs problem is non-existent. Conversely,
when h = 1 there is no dynamic problem, but the beliefs problem is very severe. It turns
out that the different size of the beliefs problem across different values n exactly cancels
the dynamic problem. In the equilibrium with small shocks, agents are very optimistic at
the threshold when n = 0 and very pessimistic when n = 1. Why?
Consider an agent deciding on the threshold θ∗ when n = 0. She knows that if negative
shocks hit, that will not change the level of economic activity. But if positive shocks hit,
the economy will bifurcate up and leave the investment slump. Good shocks create a
boom, while bad shocks do not worsen economic activity. Conversely, when n = 1 and
the economy is at the threshold θ∗, good shocks do not increase economic activity, while
bad shocks trigger an investment slump. The beliefs that arise in equilibrium offset the
dynamic coordination trap, eliminating the need for higher subsidies at times of low
economic activity.
Figure 15: Dynamic problem and beliefs problem σ = 0
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3.3.4 Numerical solution
In this section we discuss some of the positive implications of the model of Guimaraes and
Machado (2017) through some numerical examples. The goal here is not to provide an
extensive quantitative analysis, but only to illustrate how this class of models can be used
by macroeconomists interested in business cycles. First, it will be shown how to solve the
model numerically. Then, through some simple simulations, we discuss some properties
of the model.
Before solving the model we make a departure from our baseline framework. Instead of
assuming the dZt follows a Brownian motion, we assume that it follows a mean reverting
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dθt = η(µ− θt)dt+ dZt,
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with η and σ larger than zero. When η = 0 we are back to the case studied throughout this
survey. The parameter η represents the strength of mean reversion on the process for θt.
The parameter µ represents the mean it reverts to. Mean reversion is a desirable property
when taking this kind of model to the data, so that cycles become frequent. Notice that
our proof for uniqueness does not work in that case. Fortunately, Frankel and Burdzy
(2005) show that under some additional technical assumptions, the equilibrium is still
unique with mean reversion. Moreover, even without additional assumptions, numerically
one can verify that if there is multiplicity, it does not seem to matter quantitatively.
Discrete approximation. In order to solve the model numerically, we work with an ap-
proximation of the model. Now time is discrete and each period has length ∆, where ∆
is a small number. Hence t ∈ {0,∆, 2∆, 3∆, ...}. The stochastic process of θt is given by
θt = θt−1 + (µ− θt−1) ∆ + σ
√
∆t,
where t are iid normal shocks with zero mean and unit variance. At the beginning of
each period, after θt is observed,
(
1− e−δ∆) individuals are randomly selected and get a
chance to switch regime. Agents discount their utility between two periods by the factor
e−ρ∆t. When ∆→ 0 this model converges to the continuous time model.
Threshold computation. Our goal is to find a threshold where agents are indifferent
between actions 1 and 0 if they believe others will play according to that threshold. The
steps are basically the following:
1. Pick an arbitrary threshold θ∗0 and choose a finite grid for n in the interval [0, 1].
2. For every point n in the grid, simulate N paths of θt and nt departing from (θ
∗
0(n), n),
assuming every agent will play according to θ∗0. Use those paths to estimate the gain
in utility from choosing action 1 of an agent choosing at (θ∗0(n), n).
3. If the gain in utility is close to zero in every point of the grid, stop. Otherwise,
update θ∗0 and go back to step 2.
Alternatively, we can assume every agent is choosing action 0 and find the threshold that
determines the region where choosing 1 is a dominant strategy (call it θH0 ). Then assume
all agents play according to θH0 , find again the best response and keep iterating until it
converges. Of course, we could start the iterations assuming everyone chooses action 1 in
the first iteration.
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Numerical results. We illustrate the workings of the model here through a numerical
example.14 Figure 16 shows the computed threshold. The dotted line represents a path
for (θt, nt).
Figure 16: Estimated threshold
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Note that the threshold is to the right of θ = 0 when n = 0 and to to left when n = 1.
It means that at the long-run average of θt, which is zero in this example, the economy can
be either to the right or to the left of the threshold, depending on agents’ past decisions
(which are summarized by nt). Thus, at the point (θ, n) = (0, 0), the economy will not
leave the investment slump unless sufficiently good shocks hit. Similarly, at the point
(θ, n) = (0, 1), sufficiently negative shocks are needed to trigger a regime change.
Figure 17 shows the output dynamics in this economy. The economy is simulated using
a sequence of random shocks dZt, starting at a point in which n0 = 1 and θ0 = µ = 0 (the
‘steady-state’ of θt). The solid line represents the log deviations of output relative to its
initial value. The dotted line represents the deviations of productivity θt, which would be
equivalent to the log deviations of output if firms always operated in regime High (note
that in regime High output is eθtxH).
Two important messages come from this figure. First, when shocks are large, the
coordination mechanism amplifies the shocks to productivity in this economy, as reflected
by the higher fall in output after sufficiently bad shocks. Second, the model generates
slow recoveries. Productivity returns to its initial level much earlier than output. This
illustrates the potential of this kind of framework to generate deep recessions and slow
recoveries.
14The parameters used are ε = 4, xH = 1.05, xL = 1, δ = 1, ψ = 0.0364, σ = 0.03, ρ = 0.03, η = 0.7, µ = 0.
34
Figure 17: Amplification and slow recovery
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3.4 Housing and coordination
The basic framework considers a continuum of agents with measure one. However, it also
fits cases where there is a fixed supply of positions and two large groups of agents that
bid for those positions.
In the model of Frankel and Pauzner (2002), there is a measure-one continuum of
houses in a neighborhood and a larger measure of agents of two groups (they call them
‘blacks’ and ‘whites’, we will call them 0 and 1). An agent from group i ∈ {0, 1} living in
the neighborhood gets a flow utility ui(θt, nt) where θt indicates the relative attractiveness
of the neighborhood for people in group 1 (the attractiveness of other neighborhoods is
normalized to zero) and nt is the measure of houses owned by people from group 1. It is
assumed that u0 is increasing in (1− nt) and u1 is increasing in nt.
People living in the neighborhood get moving opportunities at rate δ (say they have to
go somewhere else). When this happens, they sell their houses to whoever offers a larger
price (there is a large number of people from both groups willing to buy the house).
For an individual from group i at time τ , a house in the neighborhood is worth
P iτ =
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)E [ui(θt, nt)] dt+
∫ ∞
τ
δe−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)E
[
P St (θt, nt)
]
dt,
The first term is the utility the agent will get while living in the house until she has to
move. The second term is the expected price the agent gets when she sells the house,
where P St (θt, nt) is the price she sells a house when the state is (θt, nt). Note that the
second term does not depend on the type of agent (the value of the house does not depend
on the type of the seller, she has to sell it anyway).
An individual from group 1 will outbid individuals from group 0 if and only if P 1τ > P
0
τ .
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That happens if: ∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)E [∆u(θt, nt)] dt ≥ 0
where ∆u(θt, nt) = u1(θt, nt)− u0(θt, nt). This is equivalent to the expression in (1), and
since ∆u is increasing in θt and in nt, all results from Section 2 apply here.
4 Extensions
Frankel and Pauzner (2000) assume that fundamentals follow a Brownian motion and
allow for a deterministic drift. Frankel and Burdzy (2005) generalize the uniqueness
result allowing for seasonal and mean-reverting shocks to θ. Danie¨ls (2009) extends the
uniqueness result to the case where θ follows a jump diffusion process and derives an
expression analogous to (14) for the case of vanishing frictions.
Plantin and Shin (2011) extend the model to allow for payoffs that depend not only
on nt but also on n˙t. Besides showing a uniqueness result, they use the model to study
whether carry trades have a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect.
This section considers three other extensions: a model where agents choose the switch-
ing rate from a continuous set; the case with ex-ante heterogeneous agents; and an envi-
ronment with coordination and preemption motives, suitable to the study of crises.
4.1 Endogenous timing
So far agents were not allowed to decide about the timing of their opportunities to switch
actions. But in many applications this can be an important margin of adjustment. For
instance, a firm looking for a worker may decide to increase its search intensity if it faces
higher demand; a firm building a new plant may want to speed up its construction if
the economy is booming; a consumer unsatisfied with his current cell phone may want to
try to sell it on secondary markets. The framework of Frankel and Burdzy (2005) allows
agents to choose the arrival rate of their switching opportunities.
Now agents choose the switching rate instead of actions 0 and 1 directly. Agents
locked in action 0 choose an arrival rate δ0 of the Poisson process. Once the Poisson
shock hits, the agent automatically switches to action 1 (she cannot choose if she wants
to go). Similarly, agents locked in action 1 choose the switching rate δ1 of the Poisson
process that will send them to regime 0. At date t, an agent in regime 1 that chooses
some arrival rate δ1t must pay a cost c
1(δ1t ). Therefore, the flow payoff of this agent is
given by u1(θt, nt)− c1(δ1t ). Similarly, agents in regime 0 bear a cost c0(δ0t ) and their flow
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payoff is u0(θt, nt) − c0(δ0t ). We assume that cj(·) weakly increasing and left-continuous
in δj. Moreover, δjt ∈ Kj, where Kj is some closed interval in R+. The relative gain of
being in regime high is
D(θ, n, δ0, δ1) = ∆u(θ, n)− [c1(δ1)− c0(δ0)] .
It is assumed that D(·) is weakly increasing and Lipschitz in θ and n.15 Moreover, we
make the assumption below, which is simply the counterpart of Assumption 1.
Assumption 2 (Existence of dominance regions). There exists θ˜ and θ˜ such that: if
θt > θ˜, it is strictly dominant for players in regime 0 (1) to switch at the maximal
(minimal) rate; if θt < θ˜ it is strictly dominant for players in regime 0 (1) to switch at
the minimal (maximal) rate.
This framework can easily accommodate the baseline model. We can set K0 = K1 =
[0, δ] and c0(δ0) = c1(δ1) = 0, for every n, δ0 and δ1. Then, choosing action j with
probability p conditional on getting the chance in the baseline model, is equivalent to
choosing an arrival rate δjt = (1− p)δ and δ1−jt = pδ in this model.
Let ∆Vτ denote the lifetime utility of being in regime 1 minus the lifetime utility of
being in regime 0, at date τ . This is given by
∆Vτ = Eτ
[∫ ∞
τ
e−
∫ t
τ (ρ+δ0t+δ1t )dtD
(
θt, nt, δ
0
t , δ
1
t
)
dt
]
.
Note that δ0t and δ
1
t appear on the discount factor. This is because the difference in utility
between agents in regime 1 and 0 becomes zero whenever both agents are in the same
regime. It happens either when an agent in regime 1 switches to regime 0; or when an
agent in regime 0 switches to regime 1. The probability that none of those events have
happened at some date t > τ is exp{− ∫ t
τ
(δ0t + δ
1
t ) dt}.
As shown in Frankel and Burdzy (2005), there is a unique equilibrium in this game.
At each date τ , agents in regime 1 choose a switching rate δ1 = δ1∗(nt, θt) to maximize
δ1∆(−Vτ )− c1(δ1).
Similarly, agents in regime 0 choose a switching rate δ0 = δ0∗(nt, θt) to maximize
δ0∆Vτ − c0(δ0). (31)
If the solution is interior, these expressions are simply stating that agents equalize the
marginal cost of increasing the probability of switching with the expected gain. In equi-
librium, agents take as given their own switching rate in the future and the switching rate
15Under some additional assumptions, the cost c(·) can also depend on nt. See Frankel and Burdzy (2005).
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of others (∆V is taken as given) and simply maximize the instantaneous benefit of doing
it.
4.1.1 The planner’s problem
We add the assumption that costs cj(·) are convex. This implies that the planner chooses
the same hazard rate for every agent. For simplicity, we assume a constant hazard rate
for agents locked in action 1, equal to δ1, with c1(δ1) = 0. Hence welfare in this economy
is given by
Eτ
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρ(t−τ)W (θt, nt, δ0t )dt,
with
W (θt, nt, δ
0
t ) = ntu1(θt, nt) + (1− nt)[u0(θt, nt)− c0(δ0t )]
The strategy here follows Guimaraes and Machado (2017) and is similar to the em-
ployed in Section 2.3. Suppose the planner is following the optimal plan and consider the
following deviation: change δ0t to δ˜ at τ for an infinitesimal period dt and keep future
choices for every realization of the Brownian path in the future unchanged. This affects
current costs and output net of switching costs for all s > τ . Since there are 1−nt agents
locked in action 0, costs change by
[c0(δ˜)− c0(δ0t )](1− nt)dt (32)
and the immediate effect on nt is
dnτ = (δ˜ − δ0t )(1− nt)dt. (33)
This effect dies out in time:
dns = dnτ −
∫ s
τ
dnv
(
δ0v + δ
1
)
dv,
which implies that
dns = dnτe
− ∫ sτ (δ0v+δ1)dv. (34)
The effect on welfare W net of switching costs for s > τ is
Eτ
∫ ∞
τ
e−ρ(s−τ)
(
∂W (θs, ns, δ
0
s)
∂ns
dns
)
ds. (35)
This deviation cannot be profitable. Hence, putting together (32), (33), (34) and (35), it
must be that
(δ˜ − δ0t )Eτ
∫ ∞
τ
e−
∫ s
τ (ρ+δ0v+δ1)dv
(
∂W (θs, ns, δ
0
s)
∂ns
)
ds−
[
c0(δ˜)− c0(δ0t )
]
≤ 0,
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for any δ˜ ∈ [0, δ]. That is equivalent to stating that a necessary condition for the planner’s
solution is that δ0t must maximize
δ0τEτ
∫ ∞
τ
e−
∫ s
τ (ρ+δ0v+δ1)dv
(
∂W (θs, ns, δ
0
s)
∂ns
)
ds− c0(δ0τ ). (36)
This expression is similar to (31). The difference is the term ∂W (θs, ns, δ
0
s)/∂ns inside the
integral instead of D (θs, ns, δ
0
s). As in (9), the planner considers the externality on other
agents. Mathematically, finding the solution to the planner’s problem is thus equivalent
to finding a solution to a game played by agents that maximize (36).
4.1.2 Examples
Let’s say agents are firms and each firm has a job that can be either filled (locked in action
1) or vacant (locked in action 0). Firms with a vacant job choose the search intensity δ0
and matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate δ1, with c1(δ1) = 0 (so K1 is a singleton).
A vacant job yields a flow payoff u0(θt, nt) = 0 and a filled job generates a flow payoff
u1(θt, nt) that is increasing in both arguments – θt can be seen as a measure of productivity
and it is assumed that firms’ profits are larger when output in the economy (proportional
to nt) is larger.
This is the essence of the model of Howitt and McAfee (1992). They show the existence
of multiple equilibria in this setting with no shocks to θ. If θ follows a Brownian motion, we
can apply the results in Frankel and Burdzy (2005), so the model has a unique equilibrium.
The model in Section 3.3 can also be extended to allow for endogenous hazard rates.
Firms can be in two regimes: 0 (low capacity) and 1 (high capacity). Firms in regime 1
have some capital that fully depreciate at some exogenous rate. Once it depreciates, firms
can decide how much resources (if any) they will spend building a fixed unit of capital
(say, constructing a new plant). In other words, they choose the arrival rate of the new
plant. The more resources spent, the more likely the new plant will be ready to operate.
Guimaraes and Machado (2017) show that the constant-subsidy result also applies to this
setting.
4.2 Ex ante heterogeneous agents
A consumer deciding between Facebook and another social network takes into account
what others have been choosing but also her own tastes; a firm’s investment decisions
might depend on other firms’ investment (which affects aggregate demand), but also on
idiosyncratic factors that affect the demand for its particular product. In these and other
39
settings, both strategic complementarities and idiosyncratic features of preferences or
technologies are important. While strategic complementarities lead agents to try to do
what others will be doing, idiosyncratic components of preferences might push agents in
different directions. Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) study the interplay of complementar-
ities and heterogeneity in payoffs in a dynamic setting with timing frictions as in Frankel
and Pauzner (2000).
Denote agent i’s relative flow-payoff of choosing action 1 by ∆uq(i)(θ, n), where θ ∈ R
denotes the fundamentals of the economy, n ≡ ∫ 1
0
aidi is the fraction of agents currently
committed to action 1, as before, and q(i) ∈ Q = {1, ..., Q} is agent i’s type. All functions
piq(.) are continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments. If we let
αq denote the mass of type-q agents in the population and nq the proportion of type-q
agents currently playing 1, n can be written as n =
∑Q
q=1 αqnq.
An agent who receives a revision opportunity at time τ will choose ai = 1 whenever
E
∫ ∞
τ
e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ)∆uq(i)(θt, nt)dt > 0
and ai = 0 if the inequality is reversed.
Assumption 1 is now replaced by the assumption that all payoff functions ∆uq(.) are
such that there are dominance regions for all types of agents. That is, for each q ∈ Q,
there are values θ˜q and θq˜ such that: if θt > θ˜q, playing 1 is a dominant action, and ifθt < θ˜q, playing 0 is a dominant action for type-q agents.
In principle, one could expect the dynamics of the system to depend on the proportion
of each type of agent currently choosing each option. However, owing to the assumption
of a Poisson process for the arrival rate of switching opportunities, we can deal with this
problem in a two-dimensional space. Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) show that for any
given a strategy profile, the dynamics of nt (i.e., ∂nt/∂t) depends on each nq,t (for q ∈ Q)
only through nt. Denote by It the set of types whose strategies prescribe action 1 at time
t. We have that
∂nt
∂t
= δ
[∑
q∈It
αq − nt
]
(37)
Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) then show that the uniqueness result in Theorem 1
extends to this environment. Agents choose action 1 when θt > θ
∗
q(nt) and action 0 when
θt < θ
∗
q(nt), where θ
∗
q(·) for q ∈ Q are decreasing functions. The argument employs a
strategy of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies similiar to the proof of
Theorem 1.
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4.2.1 Bifurcation probabilities
From now on, assume there are only two types of agents, Q = {q, q}. Suppose there
is a mass α of type-q agents, and assume that the utility functions are such that for
any pair (θ, n) we have ∆uq(θ, n) > ∆uq(θ, n), i.e., type-q agents have a higher relative
instantaneous payoff of choosing action 1 in every state.
The result in Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (1998) essentially states that as µ, σ → 0,
the probabilities of the economy bifurcating up and down are proportional to the speed
that the economy moves in either direction around the threshold, as in (10). Hence
we can extend Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner’s (1998) result on bifurcation probabilities
to the case with heterogeneous agents. Suppose agents play according to two arbitrary
(downward sloping and Lipschitz) thresholds θq(n) < θq(n) for all n in some interval
(n1, n2). Consider a point along one of those thresholds with n ∈ (n1, n2). As µ, σ → 0,
the time it takes for the system to bifurcate either up or down converges to zero, the
probabilities of an upward or a downward bifurcation are computed as follows:
1. For a point (θt, nt) with θt = θq(nt),
P (up) =
0 if n ≥ α,1− n
α
if n < α,
and P (down) = 1− P (up).
2. For a point (θt, nt) with θt = θq(nt).
P (up) =
 1−n1−α if n > α,1 if n ≤ α,
and P (down) = 1− P (up).
Figure 18: Bifurcation probabilities with two thresholds
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θq
α
θq
n˙ = −δn n˙ = δ(1− n)n˙ = δ(α− n)
P (down) = 1
P (down) = nα
Figure 18 illustrates the dynamics around the two types’ thresholds in case they do not
intersect (see equation 37) and the implied bifurcation probabilities along the thresholds.
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As in the case with a single threshold, starting somewhere along the curves θq or θq, once
the economy has headed off in one direction, it does not revert to the threshold, since it
is downward sloping and shocks to fundamentals are small. The direction of bifurcation
depends on the realization of the Brownian motion in a tiny time span and on the speed
at which n increases or decreases at each side of the threshold.
To fix ideas, consider a point (θq(n), n) with n > α. Small negative shocks bring the
economy to the left of θq, a region in which n decreases. A tiny shock to the right also puts
the economy in a region where n decreases – at a lower speed, but still.16 Hence, regardless
of the direction of the (small) shocks that hit, the economy immediately heads off in the
direction of n = 0: the system bifurcates down with probability one. Now, suppose n < α.
Negative shocks that bring the economy to the left of θq make n decrease at maximum
speed, while positive shocks that lead the economy to the right of the threshold make n
increase at rate δ(n− α).
4.2.2 Results for limiting cases
Once again we focus on the tractable limiting cases with vanishing shocks to fundamentals
and vanishing timing frictions. Let θ∗q(n) and θ
∗
q(n) denote the two types’ equilibrium
thresholds when µ, σ → 0. The equilibrium properties in this case depend on the degree
of payoff heterogeneity.
Denote by Pq the boundary of the upper dominance region of a type-q agent, i.e.,
the curve along which such agent is indifferent between the two actions if she believes
everyone after her will choose 0 (the most pessimistic beliefs possible about the path of
n). Analogously, let Oq be the boundary of the lower dominance region for a type-q player
– the curve along which the agent is indifferent between 0 and 1 if she believes everyone
will choose 1 in the future. If heterogeneity is not too large, dominance regions are such
that Oq < Pq(n) ∀n, so there is a region in which neither action is dominant for both
types of agents. Figure 19 illustrates this case.
Proposition 2 shows the main equilibrium properties for the case of vanishing shocks
when heterogeneity is not so large.17
Proposition 2. In the setting with two types of agents and vanishing shocks, in the unique
rationalizable equilibrium, if O(n) < P (n) ∀n, then θ∗q(n) = θ∗q(n) for all n in an interval
containing α. Moreover, there are neighborhoods around 0 and 1 in which θ∗q(n) < θ
∗
q(n).
16Between the thresholds, all high-type agents who get the chance will play 1, but all low-types will play 0. When n > α,
there are more agents currently committed to action 1 than agents willing to choose 1 , so n decreases at a rate δ(n− α).
17See Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) for the proof.
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Figure 19: The case of not-so-large heterogeneity
n = 1
n = 0
θ
Oq Oq PqPq
No dominant
action for
neither
Proposition 2 states that there is some conformity in agents’ behavior as long as het-
erogeneity is not large enough to make it impossible for agents to play according to the
same threshold for any (arbitrary) set of beliefs. Moreover, different types choose ac-
cording to the same threshold for an intermediate range of n, but for extreme values of
n, heterogeneity in preferences beats coordination motives and each type has a distinct
threshold. Figure 20 illustrates this result.
Figure 20: Equilibrium with small heterogeneity and σ → 0
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ∗q
θ∗q
To better understand the result, suppose agents play according to distinct thresholds
as in Figure 18. For n = α, an agent at the leftmost threshold holds the most pessimistic
beliefs, that n will surely decrease from then on at maximum speed. Hence an agent will
not choose action 1 unless it is dominant to do so. Conversely, an agent at the rightmost
threshold holds the exact opposite beliefs, and thus will not choose 0 unless it is dominant
to do so. This reasoning implies that an equilibrium with two distinct thresholds at
n = α would require (i) high-type agents being indifferent between either choice for some
θ˜ under the most pessimistic beliefs; and (ii) low-type agents being indifferent between
either choice for some θ > θ˜ under the most optimistic beliefs, which cannot happen in the
case of low heterogeneity. Owing to the large dispersion in beliefs offsetting idiosyncratic
payoffs, both thresholds will coincide at n = α.
An analogous reasoning helps understand why for extreme values of n thresholds for
distinct types do not coincide. Consider n = 0. Notice beliefs at the two thresholds
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are not so different: both types expect the economy to bifurcate up with probability
one. The speed n will move up is not the same in both cases, but that is not such a
significant difference in beliefs. That is why even a small difference in preferences leads
to the existence of two distinct thresholds.
Consider now the limiting case of δ → ∞. The next proposition emphasizes some
properties of the equilibrium when distinct types’ flow payoffs differ by a constant.18
Proposition 3. Let ∆uq(θ, n) = ∆u(θ, n) + ε and ∆uq(θ, n) = ∆u(θ, n) + ε, where ∆u(.)
is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in both arguments and ε > ε. Define
εˆ ≡ αε+ (1− α)ε and zˆ∗ as satisfying ∫ 1
0
∆u (zˆ∗, n) dn = −εˆ.
In the limit as δ → ∞, ∀n, the vertical line zˆ∗ divides the state space in two regions:
whenever θt > zˆ
∗, nt ≈ 1 and whenever θt < zˆ∗, nt ≈ 0.
Proposition 3 states that if heterogeneity is not so large, the economy behaves as
if agents were identical and had an intermediate preference parameter εˆ.19 Although
agents’ strategies do not coincide, agents of a given type immediately switch actions
when fundamentals cross the vertical division line, and the change in n leads the opposite
type to switch actions as well. Since revision opportunities arrive at a very fast pace,
the dynamics of the economy is basically the same as if agents were identical. Figure 21
illustrates the result.
Figure 21: Equilibrium when δ →∞
n = 1
n = 0
θ
z∗
z∗
zˆ∗
The planner’s problem when agents are ex ante heterogeneous can be solved in an
analogous way to the one presented in section 2.3. Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) show
that the region of the state space where the planner would choose the same strategy for
different types is always larger than the region where agents play the same strategy in the
decentralized equilibrium. Therefore, from an efficiency perspective, there is not enough
conformity. Agents do not internalize the spillovers from their action, and thus do not
put enough weight on coordination relative to their own idiosyncratic tastes.
18For general payoff functions, one can use the bifurcation probabilities to compute the equilibrium analytically.
19See Guimaraes and Pereira (2017) for the proof.
44
4.3 Coordination and preemption
We now modify our framework so that agents also worry about preemption. This might be
important in applications such as bank runs and currency crises. Consider, for example, a
currency pegged to the dollar that might depreciate if enough agents take short positions.
While everybody is long, the peg is more likely to be kept, which increases incentives
for going long; but if everyone decides to short the currency, the peg is more likely to be
abandoned, which raises incentives for agents to go short. This might look like a particular
case of a coordination game, but there is an important difference: if agents decide to go
short and the peg is likely to be abandoned, one wants to go short before others do it. At
this point, there is no coordination game, as agents want to preempt others.
We consider a version of the model in Guimaraes (2006). Agents have 1 unit of re-
sources. An agent that is long in the currency gets return r as long as the peg is kept, so
an agent long in the currency for T units of time gets erT , where r is a positive constant.
However, when the peg is abandoned, an agent who is long in the currency sees its bal-
ances multiply by e−θ. The return for the agents that are not long in the currency are
normalized by 0.
The fundamental variable θ and the mass of agents long in the currency n determine
whether the peg will be abandoned or not. Denote by θ˜ a function of n that determines
when the peg is abandoned. Assume θ˜(0) = 0, θ˜(1) = Θ¯ for some Θ¯ > 0 and θ˜ is increasing
for n ∈ [0, Θ¯]. The game is over (and agents long in the currency lose money) whenever
(θ, n) hits (θ˜(n), n). For a given θ, the peg is kept as long as n is large enough. Figure 22
provides an illustration.
Figure 22: Game is on if the economy is at the left of θ˜
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ˜
0
Each agent gets the opportunity to change position according to an independent Pois-
son process with arrival rate δ, assumed to be greater than r. We make the simple
assumption that dθt = µdt, for some µ > 0.
20
20Guimaraes (2006) also considers the case where θ follows a Brownian motion (with a trend).
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Related models. Danie¨ls (2009) studies crises in a model closer to Frankel and Pauzner
(2000) and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001), but allows for jumps in the fundamental
variable θ. In his model, agents actions are always strategic complements.
There are also similarities between the model of debt runs in He and Xiong (2012)
and this one. One key difference is that in He and Xiong (2012), there is an exogenous
credit line instead of something similar to nt, so their economy is not pictured in a two-
dimensional graph similar to Figures 2 or 22 and the model is solved in a different way.
4.3.1 Equilibrium
It can be shown that agents with an opportunity to choose will go long if the economy
is at the left of a positively-inclined threshold (call it θ∗), and will stay out otherwise.
Figure 23 shows the decision threshold θ∗ and the regions agents choose to go long (L)
and decide not to do so (N).
Figure 23: Agents deciding according to θ˜
n = 1
n = 0
θ
θ˜
0
θ∗
NL
Suppose the economy crosses the threshold θ∗ when n = n0. Denote by n˜ the value of
n when the economy hits the threshold θ˜ and let Θ˜ ≡ θ˜(n˜). As µ > 0, an agent at θ∗(n0)
knows that everybody will choose to stay out from then on. So, the time for a devaluation
is related to the fraction of agents that is able to run before the devaluation:
n˜ = n0 e
−δ∆T , (38)
where ∆T is the time that it takes for the peg to collapse after θ crosses the threshold.
An agent that is long in the currency sees her resources multiplied by exp(rdt) at every
dt as long as the peg has not been abandoned. However, when the devaluation comes,
her balance is multiplied by exp(−θ). The only source of uncertainty is the realization of
the Poisson process. The expected payoff of a long position is
Epi =
∫ ∆T
0
δe−δtertdt + er∆T e−Θ˜
∫ ∞
∆T
δe−δtdt.
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The first term is what an agent gets if she gets an opportunity to change behavior before
time ∆T . The second term is the agent’s return if she is caught by the devaluation. An
agent is indifferent between a long position and staying out if
Epi =
(
1− e−(δ−r)∆T ) δ
δ − r + e
(r−δ)∆T−Θ˜ − 1
which yields
∆T =
log
(
δ
r
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜
)
δ − r . (39)
The expressions in (38) and (39) yield:
n˜
n0
=
(
r
re−Θ˜ + δ
(
1− e−Θ˜)
) δ
δ−r
. (40)
Let ψ = δ
r
. Then, (40) can be written as:
n˜
n0
=
(
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜
) −ψ
ψ−1
. (41)
The expression in (41) and the function θ˜ determine Θ˜ and n˜. Then, (38) pins down ∆T .
We then need to determine the agents’ decision threshold. Let Θ∗ ≡ θ∗(n0). It is pinned
down using the expression for the distance covered since agents start to choose to stay
out:
∆T =
Θ˜−Θ∗
µθ
(42)
Results One implication of (41) is that for a given ψ, Θ˜ and n˜ do not depend on δ or
r. Intuitively, the benefit per unit of time r does not matter; what matters is the benefit
per unit of the number of opportunities to run away r/δ.
We now show the following results:
1. Θ˜ and n˜ are decreasing in ψ. Hence Θ˜ and n˜ are decreasing in δ and increasing in r.
2. As ψ →∞,
lim
ψ→∞
n˜ = lim
ψ→∞
Θ˜ = lim
ψ→∞
∆T = lim
ψ→∞
Θ∗ = 0.
We first prove the first statement. Taking logs from (41) and rearranging yields
F = ψ − 1
ψ
[log(n˜)− log(n0)] + log
(
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜.
)
= 0 (43)
Differentiating F with respect to n˜ leads to
∂F
∂n˜
=
ψ − 1
ψn˜
+
(ψ − 1)e−Θ˜
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜)+ e−Θ˜ ∂θ˜∂n˜ > 0.
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Hence, using the implicit function theorem, in order to show that n˜ is decreasing in ψ we
need to show that F is increasing in ψ. Differentiating F with respect to ψ, we get
∂F
∂ψ
=
1− e−Θ˜
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜)+ e−Θ˜ − 1ψ2 [log(n0)− log(n˜)]
=
1− e−Θ˜
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜)+ e−Θ˜ − log
(
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜
)
ψ(ψ − 1)
>
1− e−Θ˜
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜)+ e−Θ˜ − ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜ − 1
ψ(ψ − 1)
> 0.
The second equality uses (43), the first inequality uses
log
(
ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜
)
< ψ
(
1− e−Θ˜
)
+ e−Θ˜ − 1,
and the second inequality requires some algebra.
For the second statement, suppose that limψ→∞ Θ˜ is bounded away from 0. Then
from (41), limψ→∞ n˜ = 0, which contradicts the assumptions on the function θ˜. Hence
limψ→∞ Θ˜ = 0, which implies limψ→∞ n˜ = 0. The results for ∆T and Θ∗ then follow from
(39) and (42).
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